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OPTIMAL COST OVERRUNS:
PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS WITH RENEGOTIATION
FABIAN HERWEG AND MARCO A. SCHWARZ
Abstract. Cost overrun is ubiquitous in public procurement. We argue that this
can be the result of a constrained optimal award procedure: The procurer awards
the contract via a price-only auction and cannot commit not to renegotiate. If
cost differences are more pronounced for a fancy than a standard design, it is
optimal to fix the standard design ex ante. If renegotiation takes place and the
fancy design has higher production costs or the contractor’s bargaining position
is strong, the final price exceeds the initial price. Moreover, the procurer cannot
benefit from using a multi-dimensional auction, i.e., under the optimal scoring
auction each supplier proposes the standard design.
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1. Introduction
Renegotiation of procurement contracts awarded by public authorities are ubiqui-
tous. The initial contract is awarded via competitive tendering; i.e., via an auction.
The terms of the initial contract, however, are often subject to renegotiation with
the result that the ultimate price is (by far) higher than the price which the parties
initially agreed upon. Prominent recent examples of public procurement projects
that are by far more expensive than initially planned are the Elbphilharmonie, a
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concert hall in Hamburg, the Big Dig, a highway artery in Boston, and the North-
South metro line in Amsterdam.1 What is often considered as the most severe case
of a cost overrun in modern construction history is the Sydney Opera House.2 The
project was completed 10 years late at a price of 14.6 times the initial price.3 During
the construction of the Sydney Opera House, plenty of design changes had taken
place. For instance, the design of the roof has been changed from a relatively flat
roof to the fancy ribbed ellipsoidal roof, which increased the cost for the roof by
65%. This and other changes that arguably made the Sydney Opera House more
complex are responsible for a part of its cost overrun.4
Next to casual observations, empirical studies document that the prices typically
increase through renegotiation.5 According to public opinion, these cost overruns
are a sign of inefficient project management by bureaucrats or of strategizing politi-
cians and thus a waste of taxpayers’ money. In contrast to this widespread public
opinion, we argue that these seemingly inefficient cost overruns can be the result of
a constrained optimal award procedure that minimizes the expected final price for
the procurer.
In our model, a procurer needs an indivisible good or service, which can take
one of two designs; i.e., a standard (low quality) or a “fancy” (high quality) design
(a bridge with two or three traffic lanes). The good can be delivered by several
suppliers that may differ in their privately known production costs. Moreover, the
ex post efficient design depends on the contractor’s production cost – i.e., on the
1Regarding the Elbphilharmonie the accepted offer from the underwriting group in 2006 was
241 million euro. The final price at the hand-over of keys in 2016 was 789 million euro (Fiedler
and Schuster, 2016). For the Amsterdam metro line the initial budget was set at 1.46 billion euro
in 2002 but the costs had risen to 3.1 billion euro in 2009. Recent estimates suggest that it will be
completed in 2017 (Chang, Salmon, and Saral, 2016). For the Boston highway artery the ultimate
price exceeded the initial price by 1.6 billion US dollar (Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis, 2014).
2We define as cost overrun the difference between the final price and the initial price at which
the procurement order has been awarded.
3When controlling for inflation, the cost overrun reduces to a factor of 7.5 (Newton, Skitmore,
and Love, 2014).
4See Newton, Skitmore, and Love (2014) and Drew (1999) for more detailed discussions of the
construction and cost increases of the Sydney Opera House.
5Substantial price increases resulting from contract renegotiation are reported by Decarolis
(2014) for Italian procurement contracts and by Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014) for Cal-
ifornian procurement contracts. German procurement contracts and the their cost increases are
listed by Fiedler and Schuster (2016). They also report that some projects perform exceptionally
well. For instance, the Chemikum, a building of the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, was com-
pleted a year earlier than planned and at a cost of only 80 million euro instead of the planned 140
million euro.
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cost type of the supplier who has been awarded with the contract. Initially the
procurer runs an auction in order to allocate the contract. Importantly, the contract
specified by the auction is a specific performance contract that can be enforced by
courts. First, we assume that the procurer can collect bids only on prices and thus
has to select one particular design of the good. More precisely, the procurement
contract for the given design is awarded to one supplier via a standard auction, e.g.,
a second-price sealed-bid auction. The design specified in the initial contract may
turn out to be inefficient, given the cost type of the contractor. In this case, we
assume that the parties engage in Coasian bargaining and implement the efficient
design ex post. Renegotiation is expected by the suppliers and thus incorporated in
their bidding behavior. The rent the contractor (the supplier who won the auction)
receives depends on his cost advantage compared to the second-lowest bidder with
regard to the initial design. We assume that cost differences are more pronounced
for the fancy than for the standard design. Under this assumption it is optimal for
the procurer to fix the standard design ex ante because this enhances competition
in the initial auction. In other words, when commitment not to renegotiate is not
feasible, it is optimal for the procurer to choose the standard design ex ante and
to potentially renegotiate to the fancy design ex post. If the cost for producing the
fancy design is higher or if the contractor’s bargaining power is not too weak, the
final (renegotiation) price exceeds the initial price; i.e., a cost overrun occurs.
An important feature of our model is that the outcome is always efficient. The
supplier who can deliver the ex post efficient design at the lowest cost wins the auc-
tion. He benefits most from contract renegotiation and thus bids most aggressively.
This implies that the unique goal of the procurer is rent extraction; i.e., choosing
the initial design such that the expected final price – for the overall efficient design
delivered by the most efficient supplier – is minimized. In other words, the procurer
does not face a rent extraction versus efficiency tradeoff.
Due to the assumption of Coasian bargaining ex post, the ex post outcome is
always efficient in our baseline model. In two extensions, we augment the baseline
model and allow for renegotiation failure. First, we consider the situation where
contract renegotiation takes place under asymmetric information. Focusing on a
simplified model with only two cost types, we show that the type is always re-
vealed via the bid. The procurer optimally specifies the standard design ex ante
and contract renegotiation typically leads to an upward price adjustment. Second,
we analyze what happens when there is an exogenous risk that the renegotiation
breaks down and the parties are stuck with the initial contract. If this risk is rather
low, it is still optimal to choose the standard design ex ante. As the risk becomes
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larger, taking into account the situation when renegotiation fails becomes more im-
portant, so the optimal initial design is likely to be the fancy one. However, as we
demonstrate in an example, upward price adjustments seem to be more likely than
downward price adjustments if renegotiation takes place; i.e., if there had been a
risk of bargaining breakdown but the parties succeed in finding an agreement.
Finally, we allow for multi-dimensional auctions – i.e., scoring auctions. The
procurer now asks for bids containing a price and a design. The supplier who places
the bid leading to the highest score – determined by a commonly known scoring
rule – wins the auction. The procurer’s initial choice is the scoring function, which
we restrict to be linear in price. If the scoring function reflects the procurer’s true
preferences, each supplier offers the optimal design given his cost. In this case,
contract renegotiation can be avoided. The optimal scoring function, however, does
not reflect the procurer’s true preferences. The optimal scoring function is such that
any supplier bids the standard design. The most efficient supplier wins the initial
auction and the parties are likely to agree to implement the fancy design at a higher
price ex post via renegotiation. In other words, a price-only auction for the standard
design outperforms scoring auctions, where suppliers place multi-dimensional bids
containing a price and a design. The reason is that a multi-dimensional auction
allows for differentiation of the suppliers’ bids, which relaxes competition between
suppliers ex ante and thus leads to higher ultimate prices. This finding is in contrast
to the existing literature on scoring auctions that assumes the procurer can commit
not to renegotiate the contract (Dasgupta and Spulber, 1989-1990; Che, 1993; Chen-
Ritzo, Harrison, Kwasnica, and Thomas, 2005).
The main findings are driven by two behavioral assumptions. First, when submit-
ting bids, suppliers foresee eventual contract renegotiation and bid more aggressively
if they can make profits via renegotiation. Second, the procurer is aware of the sup-
pliers’ bidding strategies and designs the initial auction – specifies the initial design
– so that the auction is most competitive. Regarding the first assumption, it is
widely believed in the construction literature that contractors often bid low on a
project and hope to recover the loss through renegotiation (Levin, 1998). This be-
havior is called opportunistic bidding or bid your claims (Mohamed, Khoury, and
Hafez, 2011). That contractors/bidders respond strategically to anticipated ex post
changes is also documented in the economics literature, e.g., Bajari, McMillan, and
Tadelis (2009); Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014); Iimi (2013). For instance,
Iimi (2013, p. 254) finds that “when submitting bids, firms already foresee certain
ex post adjustments [...] with cost overruns expected, firms would likely undercut
their bids significantly.” Laboratory evidence that bidders who can gain more from
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contract renegotiation bid more aggressively is provided by Chang, Salmon, and
Saral (2016). Regarding the second assumption, there is no direct evidence that
procurers take advantage of the strategic bidding of suppliers and therefore often
initially specify a standard design. There is, however, evidence that procurers often
add extra components during construction (Iimi, 2013).
The paper is structured as follows. After having discussed the related literature,
which is done in the following paragraphs, we introduce the model in Section 2. The
model is analyzed in Section 3. Asymmetric information and the risk of renegotiation
failure are discussed in Section 4, while we extend the baseline model by allowing for
multi-dimensional auctions in Section 5. The final Section 6 summarizes our findings
and concludes. All proofs are deferred to the Appendix A. Further robustness checks
can be found in Appendix B.
Related Literature. Investigation of procurement contracts is an important and
classic topic of contract theory.6 A seminal contribution analyzing procurement and
renegotiation is Tirole (1986). He analyzes the contractual relationship between
a single procurer and a single supplier with a focus on how initial contracts can
enhance non-contractible relationship specific investments.
Dasgupta and Spulber (1989-1990), Che (1993), and Chen-Ritzo, Harrison, Kwas-
nica, and Thomas (2005) analyze procurement auctions for the case that the procurer
can commit not to renegotiate the contract. All three articles show that the opti-
mal scoring auction outperforms price-only auctions. We demonstrate that if this
commitment is absent, the optimal price-only auction outperforms scoring auctions.
There is only a small extant literature that analyzes auctions without perfect
commitment; i.e., that allows either bidders to renege on their bids or to engage in
contract renegotiation.7 Waehrer (1995), Harstad and Rothkopf (1995), and Roelofs
(2002) allow bidders to withdraw the winning bid ex post. In these models suppliers
are initially uncertain about their costs and thus may underestimate it. The pos-
sibility to default on the initial commitments enhances competition in the auction,
which in turn is beneficial to the procurer.8 Waehrer (1995) also analyzes a scenario
6For an excellent discussion of the standard contract theoretical analysis of procurement see
Laffont and Tirole (1993).
7There is also a small literature that analyzes screening mechanisms if the principal (the pro-
curer) cannot commit not to renegotiate; e.g., Beaudry and Poitevin (1995). This literature typ-
ically assumes that there is only one buyer and one seller and focuses on the constraints limited
commitment power imposes on the implementable allocations.
8The effects of limited liability on more general mechanisms than auctions are investigated by
Burguet, Ganuza, and Hauk (2012).
COST OVERRUNS IN PROCUREMENT 6
where the procurer and the winner renegotiate a new contract. Here, however, rene-
gotiation takes place after the default of the winner and thus the initial contract has
no impact on the outcome of renegotiation.
A similar form of renegotiation is analyzed by Wang (2000) and Shachat and Tan
(2015). In these models the procurer either accepts the lowest bid or rejects all bids.
In case of rejection, the procurer negotiates with the supplier who placed the lowest
bid; i.e., if renegotiation takes place the initial contract concluded by the auction
is not binding. In such a setup renegotiation always leads to lower prices, which is
exactly the opposite from what we study.
The initial contract has an impact on the outcome of renegotiation in Chang,
Salmon, and Saral (2016). Here, suppliers’ production costs have an ex-ante un-
known common component. Some of the suppliers are wealth constrained, while
other have deep pockets and this is private information of each supplier. Allowing
for contract renegotiation is advantageous to wealth-constrained suppliers who can
credibly threaten to default. The prices increase with renegotiation in order to avoid
bankruptcy of the contractor who is faced by unexpectedly high costs. In our model,
the parties agree to a different design of the project ex post, which is often more
costly to produce and thus the final price exceeds the initial price.
A few papers directly deal with the issue of cost overruns. Birulin and Izmalkov
(2013) analyze what shares of a price are optimally paid before and after a potential
extra cost to the supplier realizes when suppliers are protected by limited liability.
This paper is orthogonal to ours, because it does not provide an explanation for cost
overruns but rather assumes its existence.9 Closer to our work is Ganuza (2007).
Here, suppliers are differentiated à la Salop (1979). The buyer does not know her
preferences – her location – but can invest in obtaining a noisy signal. A procure-
ment order for the expected optimal design is awarded via a price-only auction. Ex
post, the buyer’s preferences are common knowledge and the winner of the auction
can make a take-it-or-leave-it renegotiation offer. The main result is that the buyer
under-invests in learning her preferences because this enhances competition in the
initial auction. This is related to our result that the initial design is chosen to en-
hance competition in the initial auction. There are, however, crucial differences.
For instance, in Ganuza (2007) the parties renegotiate the contract because of new
incoming information about the buyer’s preferences. Cost overruns are almost auto-
matic because the ex post optimal design will with probability one be different from
the ex ante design and the contractor has the lowest production cost for the ex ante
9A similar model is analyzed by Birulin (2014).
COST OVERRUNS IN PROCUREMENT 7
design. By contrast, in our model there is no uncertainty about the buyer’s prefer-
ences and depending on the ex ante design, the price will be renegotiated downward
or upward. In other words, cost overruns are the outcome of a strategic decision in
our model. Moreover, Ganuza (2007) analyzes solely price-only auctions, while we
investigate also multi-dimensional auctions.10 A similar model where the procurer’s
preferences are initially unknown and suppliers are horizontally differentiated is an-
alyzed by De Chiara (2015). In his model, the procurer is indifferent between all
initial designs if contract renegotiation is efficient.
Finally, costly renegotiation of incomplete procurement contracts is analyzed by
Bajari and Tadelis (2001) and Herweg and Schmidt (2017). The former paper ana-
lyzes when fixed-price contracts outperform cost-plus contracts, while the latter one
derives conditions so that bilateral negotiations outperform procurement auctions.11
2. The Model
2.1. Players and Payoffs. A procurer P (she), say a government agency, wants
to buy one unit of an indivisible good, e.g., a bridge. The good can be produced
and delivered in one of two designs x ∈ {xL, xH}. Design xL is a standard design of
rather low quality, while xH is a “fancy” design of high quality. The procurer’s gross
valuation of the good is denoted by v(x), with v(xH) > v(xL). Thus, if the procurer
obtains design x at price p, her ex post utility is
(1) u = v(x)− p.
There are n ≥ 2 suppliers that can produce the good required by the procurer. A
supplier’s production cost depends on the design x and his cost type θ ∈ [
¯
θ, θ̄] ≡
Θ, and is denoted by c(x, θ). Ex ante, the cost type θ is private information of
each supplier. The n cost types are drawn independently according to an identical
cumulative distribution function F (θ). Let the corresponding probability density
be f(θ), with f(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ. When design x is delivered at price p, the
10We conjecture that scoring auctions are optimal in the model of horizontally differentiated
suppliers analyzed by Ganuza (2007). A scoring auction allows the procurer to select the ideal
supplier with a high probability but nevertheless achieves strong competition by handicapping
suppliers that can propose designs closer to the procurer’s ideal one. As we demonstrate, in our
model with vertically differentiated suppliers, the procurer cannot benefit from using a multi-
dimensional auction.
11An empirical analysis of incomplete procurement contracts is provided by Crocker and
Reynolds (1993). They argue that contracts are left incomplete intentionally to economize on
the cost of the ex ante design.
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contractor’s, i.e., the selected supplier’s, ex post payoff is
(2) π = p− c(x, θ).
All parties are assumed to be risk neutral and the outside option utilities are all set
equal to zero.
We assume that a supplier’s cost function is differentiable with respect to the
supplier’s type and satisfies the following assumption.
Assumption 1. For all θi, θj ∈ Θ with θi < θj:
(i) c(xL, θi) < c(xL, θj);
(ii) c(xH , θi)− c(xL, θi) < c(xH , θj)− c(xL, θj).
Part (i) of Assumption 1 is purely labeling; types are ordered according to how
efficient they can produce the standard (low-quality) design xL. According to part
(ii), the cost advantage is increasing in the complexity of the design; i.e., the differ-
ence in production costs between two types is larger for the fancy design xH than
for the standard design xL. This implies that for the implementation of the fancy
design, selecting an efficient supplier is more important. Assumption 1 implies that
the cost for producing design xH is also increasing in the type θ. In order to see
this, note that c(xH , θ) can be written as
(3) c(xL, θ) + [c(xH , θ)− c(xL, θ)].
This does not imply, however, that for any type, production of the fancy design xH
is more expensive than production of the standard design xL.
Finally, we assume that the ex post efficient design, x∗(θ) ∈ argmaxx∈{xL,xH}{v(x)−






xH for θ < θ̃,
{xL, xH} for θ = θ̃,
xL for θ > θ̃,
(4)
where θ̃ is implicitly defined by v(xH)− c(xH , θ̃) = v(xL)− c(xL, θ̃). Let the social
surplus generated by the ex post efficient design be
(5) S(θ) = max
x∈{xL,xH}
{v(x)− c(x, θ)},
which is decreasing in θ.
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2.2. Award Procedure and Renegotiation. The procurement contract is awarded
to one supplier, called the contractor, via an auction. For now, we focus on sim-
ple price-only auctions.12 In other words, the procurer can collect only price bids
for a given design. For the ease of exposition, we assume that the procurer uses
a second-price sealed-bid auction to award the contract for a pre-specified design
¯
x ∈ {xL, xH}. As we will explain below, the (reduced form) auction game that we
analyze satisfies the assumptions of the revenue equivalence principle and thus the
restriction to second-price auctions is without loss of generality.
When specifying the initial auction, the procurer has only one choice variable,
the initial design
¯
x ∈ X. The procurement order for the good with design
¯
x is
auctioned off between the n suppliers. Each supplier i places a secret price bid pi.
The supplier with the lowest bid is selected as the contractor and the specified price
equals the second lowest bid. If the lowest bid is made by several suppliers, one of
these suppliers is selected at random as the contractor.
With the procurer being restricted to simple auctions and suppliers’ types being
stochastic, the initial design
¯
x may not be optimal given the contractor’s type ex
post. In this case there is scope for renegotiation. We posit that the contractor’s
type is observed by the procurer after the award of the contract and thus the parties
engage in (efficient) Coasian bargaining ex post.
Assumption 2. After the award of the initial contract but before contract renego-
tiation takes place, the contractor’s type θ is observed by the procurer.
In practice, the contractor starts working on the project before the parties agree to
renegotiate. The procurer monitors the contractor and thus obtains an informative
signal – next to the contractor’s bid – about his efficiency. For simplicity we focus
on the extreme case where the contractor’s type is perfectly observed.13 Doubtlessly,
this is a strong assumption but it allows us to simplify the exposition significantly.14
The surplus from renegotiation is split between the procurer and the contractor
12The restriction to price-only auctions is relaxed in Section 5.
13Alternatively the procurer might receive a signal about the contractor’s type due to informa-
tion acquisition which would have been too costly before the selection of a certain supplier.
14If the true type of the contractor is observed ex post, the procurer could use a mechanism that
makes payments contingent on the true type; c.f. Skrzypacz (2013). As one anonymous referee
correctly pointed out, the procurer can implement the first-best allocation without leaving a rent
to suppliers by using a “shoot the liar”-mechanism: The contractor is punished severely for not
having reported the true type ex ante. Such mechanisms are hardly observed in practice. Our
paper is more in the spirit of the literature on incomplete contracts and therefore does not allow
for such mechanisms. We restrict our attention to auctions because those are commonly observed
in practice.
COST OVERRUNS IN PROCUREMENT 10
according to the generalized Nash bargaining solution (GNBS), i.e., the renegotiation
contract is
(6) (x̂, p̂) ∈ arg max
x∈{xL,xH},p∈R
[p− c(x, θ)− dC ]
α × [v(x)− p− dP ]
1−α ,
where α ∈ (0, 1) denotes the contractor’s relative bargaining power ex post.15 The















2.3. Timing of the Game. At stage 1, nature draws each supplier’s cost type θ.
The procurer selects the initial design
¯
x ∈ {xL, xH} that she seeks to purchase via
a price-only auction. At stage 2, the auction is executed; i.e., each supplier places







p is the second lowest price bid. At the beginning of stage 3,
the procurer observes the contractor’s cost type and the parties engage in Coasian
bargaining and agree to implement a renegotiation contract (x̂, p̂). The sequence of
events is depicted in Figure 1.
✲





• Suppliers submit bids.







p is the second lowest bid.
• Contractor’s cost type is
observed by procurer.
• Parties may renegotiate
to a new contract (x̂, p̂).
Figure 1. Timeline.
As equilibrium concept, we employ perfect Bayesian equilibrium in symmetric
strategies.
3. The Analysis
3.1. Contract Renegotiation and Bidding Behavior. We start the analysis
with the renegotiation game. Suppose the procurer awarded a supplier with cost




p). If the design
¯
x is not the efficient design given the
contractor’s cost type,
¯
x 6= x∗(θ), then there is scope for renegotiation. For instance,
if
¯
x = xL and the contractor’s type θ < θ̃, the social surplus can be increased by
15For a detailed description of the Nash bargaining solution see Muthoo (1999). A non-
cooperative foundation for the Nash bargaining solution is provided by Binmore, Rubinstein, and
Wolinsky (1986).
16Exactly the same findings are obtained with an alternative bargaining game, where the GNBS
is replaced by a take-it-or-leave-it offer game. With probability α the contractor can make a
take-it-or-leave-it offer in the renegotiation game, while with probability (1− α) the procurer can.
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adjusting the design from
¯
x = xL to x
∗(θ) = xH . The additional surplus is split
between the two parties according to their relative bargaining power. The outcome
of renegotiation is characterized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Renegotiation outcome). Suppose Assumption 2 holds and let the con-




p), the procurer and the









x)] + (1− α)[c(x∗(θ), θ)− c(
¯
x, θ)].
A supplier taking part in the auction is aware that the contract may be renego-
tiated ex post. In particular, he knows that if he wins the auction, he may obtain
additional profits generated by contract renegotiation. These additional profits from
renegotiation are incorporated in a supplier’s bidding behavior. Supplier θ’s ex post









p, θ) = p̂(
¯
p, θ)− c(x∗(θ), θ)
=
¯





It is important to note that the outcome of the final stage of the game, the
renegotiation game, is deterministic – it is fully determined by the GNBS. For a
given initial design
¯
x, the reduced form auction game simplifies to a standard auction.














allows us to write a supplier’s profit from winning as π =
¯
p−ψ. Importantly, there is
a one-to-one mapping from the type θ into an adjusted type ψ. Under any standard
auction format, the lowest adjusted type, which is also the lowest true type, will win
the auction. For a given initial design
¯
x, the revenue equivalence principle holds;
i.e., the expected initial price is identical for all standard auction formats. The final
allocation is also independent of the used auction format because Lemma 1 holds
irrespective of how the initial contract was determined.17
As explained above, we illustrate our findings for the case of a second-price auc-
tion. Here, the price bid affects directly the probability of winning the auction but
only indirectly the price the supplier receives when being awarded with the contract.
Thus, placing the lowest feasible bid that allows the supplier to break-even, even
when he is awarded with the contract at a price equal to his bid, is optimal. The
equilibrium bidding behavior is formally described in the next lemma.
17In Appendix B we formally establish that the revenue equivalence principle holds in our model.
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Lemma 2 (Outcome of the auction). Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and
that the procurement order for design
¯
x ∈ {xL, xH} is awarded via a second-price
sealed-bid auction. In the unique equilibrium in undominated strategies, each sup-















which is continuous and strictly increasing in θ. The supplier with the lowest type
wins the auction.
It is important to note that – according to Lemma 2 – the auction selects the
most efficient supplier. In other words, productive efficiency is always guaranteed
by a second-price auction even if contract renegotiation is feasible. This relies on
the assumption that a more efficient type has not only lower production costs for
producing design
¯
x but also generates a higher surplus by adjusting the design via
contract renegotiation. Moreover, by Lemma 1, the ex post design is always efficient.
Hence, overall efficiency is always achieved; i.e., the most efficient type delivers the
efficient design. This implies that the procurer’s problem is solely a problem of rent
extraction. She wants to procure the efficient design from the efficient supplier at
the lowest feasible price. There is no tradeoff between rent extraction and efficiency.
3.2. Constrained Optimal Auction. The procurer solely cares about the ulti-
mate price she has to pay for the good. The initial price – i.e., the price specified in
the procurement contract, is determined by the auction and depends on the cost of





x, θ2) = αv(
¯
x) + (1− α)c(
¯
x, θ2)− αS(θ2).
The ultimate price, paid by the procurer and received by the contractor, depends
not only on the second lowest type but also on the lowest type θ1. The procurer’s
ex post utility, for given realizations of θ1 and θ2, is
u(
¯





− (1− α)[c(x∗(θ1), θ1)− c(
¯
x, θ1)]





The first part of the procurer’s ex post utility can be written as S(θ2)+(1−α)[S(θ1)−
S(θ2)]; i.e., the procurer obtains the whole surplus generated by the second most
efficient type due to the competitive award procedure. On top of that, the procurer
obtains the share 1 − α of the rents that are generated by the excess efficiency of
type θ1 compared to type θ2. This, however, is only half the story. Different supplier
types benefit differently from contract renegotiation ex post. The most efficient
COST OVERRUNS IN PROCUREMENT 13
type benefits more from contract renegotiation than the second most efficient type
because he can produce design
¯
x at lower cost. Therefore, the contractor obtains
a rent which equals his advantage from contract renegotiation as compared to type
θ2, plus the share α of the additional surplus that he generates, α[S(θ1)− S(θ2)].
Now, we can state the first main finding of the paper.18
Proposition 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, the procurer opti-
mally chooses design
¯
x = xL. Renegotiation takes place if and only if θ
1 < θ̃. If this
is the case, the ultimate price exceeds the initial price – i.e., p̂ >
¯
p, if and only if
either (i) c(xH , θ
1) ≥ c(xL, θ
1), or (ii) c(xH , θ
1) < c(xL, θ
1) and α > α̂(θ1), where
α̂(θ1) ≡
c(xL, θ
1)− c(xH , θ
1)
v(xH)− v(xL) + c(xL, θ1)− c(xH , θ1)
∈ (0, 1) .
The contractor’s bid already reflects that renegotiation may take place. In other
words, part of the contractor’s profits made by contract renegotiation are competed
away in the initial auction. The profits from renegotiation that are not competed
away can be decomposed into two parts. The first part is the additional surplus
the contractor generates compared to the second most efficient supplier, S(θ1) −
S(θ2). The second part, c(
¯
x, θ2) − c(
¯
x, θ1), is due to the fact that the contractor’s
disagreement payoff is higher than the one of the second most efficient supplier;
i.e., the contractor can produce
¯
x at lower costs than all other suppliers. From the
procurer’s perspective, the first part is a random variable, which does not depend
on her choice variable, the initial project design
¯
x. The second part, on the other
hand, depends on the initial design. The more complex the initial design is, the
larger is the difference in disagreement payoffs between suppliers of different types.
Hence, in order to minimize this difference, the procurer optimally specifies the
standard (low-quality) design ex ante.19 If the type of the winner of the auction is
sufficiently efficient (low), then contract renegotiation takes place and the parties
agree to trade the fancy design xH ex post. If the fancy design is more costly to
produce for any type, renegotiation always leads to a price increase. If the winner,
type θ1, can produce the fancy design at lower cost than the standard design, then
contract renegotiation leads to a price increase only if the contractor’s bargaining
18If the procurer can specify a maximum bid R – i.e., only price bids p ≤ R are allowed in the
second-price auction – and this maximum bid is publicly announced before suppliers place their
bids, it is still optimal for the procurer to specify
¯
x = xL initially (Herweg and Schwarz, 2016).
19If α = 1, i.e., the contractor has all the bargaining power, the procurer is indifferent between
¯
x = xL and
¯
x = xH . In this case the revelation of the contractor’s type is irrelevant and we are in
the standard framework: The payoffs are pinned down by the utility of the least efficient type in
combination with the incentive constraints; i.e., all types are revealed truthfully (Myerson, 1981).
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power at the renegotiation stage is not too weak. If the procurer’s bargaining power
is strong, then a cost underrun occurs.
The next result is readily obtained by noting that the probability of contract
renegotiation is given by prob(reneg) = 1− [1− F (θ̃)]n.
Corollary 1. Contract renegotiation is more likely (in the sense of set inclusion),
the more suppliers participate in the auction.
When renegotiation is inefficient or there is a risk it might break down, however,
there is a tradeoff and the optimal ex ante design is not necessarily the standard
one any more, as we demonstrate in Subsection 4.2.
4. Asymmetric Information and Breakdown of Renegotiation
We derived our findings under a couple of strong assumptions. In particular, we
assumed that renegotiation takes place under symmetric information, which implies
that there is no risk that renegotiation may fail. In this section we address this
issue by first relaxing Assumption 2 and second by introducing an exogenous risk of
renegotiation failure.
4.1. Renegotiation with Asymmetric Information. In this subsection we as-
sume that contract renegotiation may take place under asymmetric information.
More precisely, the procurer does not observe the contractor’s cost type before the
two parties engage in contract renegotiation; i.e., we relax Assumption 2. The pro-
curer may be able to deduce the contractor’s type from the bids, which she observes.
In order to keep this signaling model as simple as possible, we restrict attention to
the case of binary types θ ∈ {θ1, θ2} ≡ Θ. As before the types are independently
drawn from the same distribution. Let prob(θ = θ1) = q ∈ (0, 1).
The good can be delivered in one of two designs, x ∈ {xL, xH}, with v(xH) >
v(xL). The type θ orders suppliers according to their efficiency in the production of
the standard design xL:
(13) c(xL, θ1) < c(xL, θ2).





xH for θ = θ1;
xL for θ = θ2.
(14)
First, this assumption implies that c(xH , θ2) > c(xL, θ2). Second, it implies that
(15) c(xH , θ2)− c(xL, θ2) > v(xH)− v(xL) > c(xH , θ1)− c(xL, θ1).
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Finally, (13) and (14) imply that S(θ1) > S(θ2). The above assumptions correspond
to Assumption 1 from the general model with a continuum of types.
Now, contract renegotiation takes place under asymmetric information and thus
we cannot apply the GNBS in order to determine the outcome of renegotiation.
Instead, we posit that the contractor can make a take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI) offer
with probability α ∈ (0, 1). With the converse probability, 1 − α, the procurer can
make a TIOLI offer at the renegotiation stage.
The equilibrium concept we employ is perfect Bayesian equilibrium in pure strate-
gies. The analysis will focus mainly on separating equlibria. In a separating equilib-
rium the two types place different bids in the auction and thus the type is revealed
to the procurer before renegotiation takes place.
For the sake of the argument suppose the procurer sets
¯
x = xL. In a separating
equilibrium, the procurer can perfectly deduce the contractor’s type from his bid.
If the contractor’s type is θ2, there is no scope for renegotiation. Suppose the
contractor’s type is θ1. If he can make the offer at the renegotiation stage, he offers




which is accepted by the procurer. If, on the other hand, the procurer can make the
offer, she offers x̂ = xH at
(17) p̂P =
¯
p+ [c(xH , θ1)− c(xL, θ1)].
The offer is accepted by type θ1. Note that this offer would be rejected by type θ2.
Thus, the final expected price of a supplier of type θ1 is
(18) p̂ =
¯
p+ α[v(xH)− v(xL)] + (1− α)[c(xH , θ1)− c(xL, θ1)].
At the auction stage, each supplier of type θ1 takes into account that contract
renegotiation will occur. A candidate for equilibrium bidding strategies are the bids
that allow a supplier just to break-even if the bid determines the price at which the






c(xH , θ1)− α[v(xH)− v(xL)]− (1− α)[c(xH , θ1)− c(xL, θ1)] if θ = θ1;






p(θ2, xL); i.e., if there is a supplier of type θ1, then a type
θ1 wins the auction. As we show in the appendix, none of the supplier types has an
incentive to deviate from the above bidding strategy.
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If, on the other hand, the procurer specifies
¯
x = xH initially, then the candidate






c(xH , θ1) if θ = θ1;
αc(xL, θ2) + (1− α)c(xH , θ2) + α[v(xH)− v(xL)] if θ = θ2.
(20)




p(θ2|xH). Hence, irrespective of the initial
design, if there is a supplier of type θ1, then a supplier of this type wins the auction.
The procurer optimally specifies
¯
x = xL if and only if E[u(xL, θ
1, θ2)] > E[u(xH , θ
1, θ2)],
which is equivalent to
(21) c(xH , θ2)− c(xL, θ2) > c(xH , θ1)− c(xL, θ1).
The above inequality is always satisfied under the imposed assumptions.
Proposition 2 (Asymmetric Information). Suppose the contractor’s type is not
observed ex post and that θ ∈ {θ1, θ2}. Then, there are separating equilibria with
bidding functions (19) and (20). For these bidding strategies, the procurer optimally
specifies the standard design
¯
x = xL initially. Contract renegotiation to the fancy
design xH takes place with probability 1− (1− q)
n. In case of contract renegotiation,
there is a cost overrun if and only if either (i) the contractor can make the TIOLI
offer, or (ii) the procurer can make the TIOLI offer and c(xH , θ1) > c(xL, θ1).
Moreover, a pooling equilibrium does not exsist.
Proposition 2 shows that the finding of Proposition 1 is not an artifact due to
Coasian bargaining ex post. With more than two types, however, we cannot expect
to obtain a fully separating equilibrium. In particular, more efficient types will
have an incentive to mimic less efficient types that do not differ with respect to
the efficient design. In such a case the procurer may make a renegotiation offer
which is accepted only by sufficiently efficient types. Now, a tradeoff between rent
extraction and efficiency may arise. This tradeoff is absent in our baseline model with
renegotiation under complete information but also in the model with asymmetric
information and only two types.
4.2. Risk of Breakdown of Renegotiation. In the baseline model and in the
simple model with binary types and asymmetric information, the efficient design is
always implemented ex post. In the following, we will show that our main findings
are robust toward introducing frictions of contract renegotiation. In order to do so,
we augment the baseline model with a continuum of types.
We model the imperfection of contract renegotiation in the following simple way.
With fixed exogenous probability b ∈ [0, 1) the parties cannot reach an agreement
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With the converse probability 1− b the parties reach an agreement and the outcome
is determined by the GNBS. The parameter b measures how intricate or how costly
contract renegotiation is. For b = 0 the model collapses to the one previously
analyzed.20
The analysis of the model with a risk of renegotiation breakdown proceeds by the
same steps as the analysis of Section 3.
Proposition 3. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and that renegotiation fails



















The procurer now faces a tradeoff. On the one hand, as before, she wants to
minimize the cost advantage that the most efficient supplier has in comparison to
the second most efficient supplier in the production of design
¯
x. This is achieved by
setting
¯
x = xL. On the other hand, the procurer has an incentive to choose as initial
design the design that is optimal when the second most efficient supplier obtains
the contract. This is intuitive because if renegotiation fails the procurer obtains
the surplus that is generated by the second most efficient type. This is likely to
be achieved by the fancy design xH . If b is sufficiently low, the former concern
dominates the latter and
¯
x = xL is optimal. As the risk of renegotiation failure
increases, the optimal ex ante design becomes (weakly) more complex.21
If
¯
x = xH is optimal, then ex post renegotiation may lead to a downward price
adjustment even if the conditions for upward price adjustments from Proposition
1 are met. How likely upward and downward price adjustments are, is intricate
to characterize without further assumptions on the type distribution, the feasible
designs, and the cost functions. Therefore, we will present the results of a simple
numerical example in the following.
Example 1. Let the procurer’s gross benefit be v(xH) = 2 and v(xL) = 1. The cost
functions are c(xH , θ) = 3θ and c(xL, θ) = θ. The types of the n ≥ 3 suppliers are
drawn independently from the uniform distribution with support [0, 1]. The ex post
20Ganuza (2007) uses the same approach to model transaction costs of contract renegotiation.
In his interpretation there are transaction costs associated with renegotiation and these costs are
stochastic. With probability 1 − b the transaction costs are zero, while with probability b the
transaction costs are prohibitively high so that renegotiation does not take place.
21We can interpret b as a bargaining inefficiency multiplier. As renegotiation becomes more
costly, the optimal ex ante design becomes (weakly) more complex.
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efficient design is x∗(θ) = xH for θ ≤ 1/2 and x
∗(θ) = xL for θ ≥ 1/2; i.e., the
marginal type is θ̃ = 1/2.
The procurer optimally specifies design
¯





As long as the risk of renegotiation failure is not too high, the procurer prefers
to specify the standard design ex ante. The stronger the contractor’s bargaining
power α, the lower is the critical threshold b̂; i.e., a strong bargaining position of the
contractor makes it less likely that
¯
x = xL is optimal.
For b > b̂ the procurer sets
¯
x = xH . In this case, if renegotiation takes place, it
leads to a downward adjustment of the price; i.e., a cost underrun. This happens if
θ1 > θ̃. Thus, the conditional probability (conditional on renegotiation taking place)
for a cost underrun is ρD = prob(θ1 > θ̃) = 1
2n
. This conditional probability is
rather low already for a moderate number of competitors; e.g., for n = 6 we have
ρD ≈ 1.6%.
For b ≤ b̂ the procurer specifies
¯
x = xL. Now, if renegotiation takes place, the price
is adjusted upwards and thus we observe a cost overrun. The conditional probability
for a cost overrun is ρU = prob(θ1 < θ̃) = 1− 1
2n
. This conditional probability is high
already for a moderate number of competitors; e.g., for n = 6 we have ρU ≈ 98.4%.
The example illustrates that even when there is a risk of renegotiation failure –
and thus a rational for the procurer to choose a more complex design than xL – ex
post adjustments leading to a cost underrun are unlikely to occur. The procurer
selects
¯
x = xH only if b is rather high, which implies that it is unlikely that the
parties are able to renegotiate the contract. Moreover, even when the parties are
able to renegotiate, contract renegotiation takes place only if the most efficient type
is rather inefficient, i.e., only if θ1 > θ̃, which is a rather unlikely event.
5. Scoring Auctions
So far we assumed that the procurer has to specify the good she wants to procure
completely ex ante, i.e., before the auction takes place. In the auction, the procurer
collected bids only on prices and the supplier who offered the lowest price has been
awarded with the contract. Different types of suppliers do not only have different
production costs but also differ in the optimal design – i.e., the design that maximizes
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the joint surplus. Therefore, it may be profitable for the procurer to ask suppliers
for bids on price and design.22
5.1. The Model with Multi-Dimensional Auctions. In the following we con-
sider a second-score auction.23 Each supplier places a bid containing a price p ∈ R
and a design x ∈ {xL, xH}. Each bid (x, p) is mapped into a single score. The
supplier who placed the bid giving rise to the highest score wins the auction and is





p) determines a binding specific-performance contract between the procurer
and the winner (the contractor). Nevertheless, this contract can be renegotiated af-
ter the auction as before.
The procurer does not choose a design when particularizing the auction. She
specifies a scoring function, G : {xL, xH} × R → R, that maps bids into a single
score. We focus on quasi-linear scoring functions of the form
G(x, p) = g(x)− p,
which implies that the procurer effectively chooses ∆g ≡ g(xH)− g(xL).
If the procurer can commit not to renegotiate the contract, the optimal quasi-
linear scoring function implements the second-best allocation (Che, 1993). Here,
the procurer cannot commit not to engage in contract renegotiation. However, as
we will show below, if the scoring function represents the procurer’s true preferences,
i.e., g(x) ≡ v(x), contract renegotiation can be avoided.
5.2. The Analysis of Multi-Dimensional Auctions. As before, we solve the
game by backward induction. The outcome of the renegotiation game is independent
of the award procedure. In other words, Lemma 1 still holds and the implemented
design will always be ex post efficient. Thus, the ex post utility of a supplier of type





















Optimal bidding behavior in the second-score auction is described by the following
result.
22Scoring auctions where bids are multi-dimensional (e.g., price and quality) are analyzed by
Che (1993) and Asker and Cantillon (2008). An excellent short review of this literature is provided
by Asker and Cantillon (2010).
23We show that our results hold for first-score auctions in Appendix B.
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Lemma 3. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. The (reduced) second-score
auction game has a dominant strategy equilibrium. The equilibrium bid of each
supplier of type θ is
xb(θ) ∈ argmax
x∈X
{g(x)− αv(x)− (1− α)c(x, θ)} ,
pb(θ) = αv(xb(θ)) + (1− α)c(xb(θ), θ)− αS(θ).
By Lemma 3, each supplier bids the optimal design, xb(θ) = x∗(θ), if the scoring
function represents the procurer’s true preferences – i.e., if v(x) ≡ g(x). If, on the
other hand, the scoring function does not reflect the true preferences of the procurer,
then it is likely that suppliers propose designs that are not efficient.
According to Lemma 3, the score offered by a supplier of type θ amounts to
G(θ) ≡ g(xb(θ))− pb(θ)
= g(xb(θ))− αv(xb(θ))− (1− α)c(xb(θ), θ) + αS(θ).(24)
As before, the most efficient type places the bid that leads to the highest score and
thus wins the auction. Thus, there is no tradeoff between rent extraction and effi-
ciency as there is for scoring auctions with commitment (Che, 1993); the procurer’s
problem is solely a problem of rent extraction.
Lemma 4. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then for all θ1 < θ2 it holds that:
G(θ1) > G(θ2).
The winner of the auction, type θ1, has to match the second highest score but is




















p = G(θ2). Hence, the initial contract specifies
¯
x(θ1, θ2) = xb(θ1)
and
¯
p(θ1, θ2) = g(xb(θ1))−G(θ2). The ultimate price paid by the procurer is
(25) p̂(θ1, θ2) = g(xb(θ1))− g(xb(θ2)) + αv(xb(θ2)) + (1− α)c(xb(θ2), θ2)
− αS(θ2) + α[v(x∗(θ1))− v(xb(θ1))]
+ (1− α)[c(x∗(θ1), θ1)− c(xb(θ1), θ1)].
5.3. The Optimality of Price-Only Auctions. We use equation (25) to derive
the procurer’s ex post utility – for given realizations of θ1 and θ2 –, which is given
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by
u(θ1, θ2) = v(x∗(θ1))− p̂(θ1, θ2)
= (1− α)S(θ1) + αS(θ2)
+ {g(xb(θ2))− αv(xb(θ2))− (1− α)c(xb(θ2), θ2)}
− {g(xb(θ1))− αv(xb(θ1))− (1− α)c(xb(θ1), θ1)}.(26)
If the designs chosen by the most efficient and the second most efficient type are
the same, i.e., xb(θ1) = xb(θ2), equation (26) is highly reminiscent to equation (12)
from the case of price-only auctions. In general, the first part of the procurer’s ex
post utility reflects that the procurer obtains the whole surplus generated by the
second most efficient type due to the competitive award procedure. In addition she
obtains the share 1 − α of the rents that are generated by the excess efficiency of
type θ1 compared to type θ2. As before, the procurer has to leave a rent to the most
efficient type which reflects type θ1’s advantage in the initial auction compared to
type θ2. Notice that the sum of the two terms in curly brackets is always negative.
This advantage is now more complex than simply the difference in production costs
for design
¯
x due to the applied scoring auction.
The procurer chooses the scoring function g(·) – or more precisely the difference
∆g = g(xH)− g(xL) – that maximizes her expected payoff E[u(θ
1, θ2)]. As it turns
out, the optimal scoring auction coincides with the optimal price-only auction.
Proposition 4. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, any optimal quasi-
linear scoring rule specifies





Each supplier type θ bids xb(θ) = xL. Renegotiation takes place if and only if θ
1 < θ̃.
If this is the case, the ultimate price exceeds the initial price – i.e., p̂−
¯
p > 0, if and
only if either (i) c(xH , θ
1) ≥ c(xL, θ
1), or (ii) c(xH , θ
1) < c(xL, θ
1) and α > α̂(θ1).
According to Proposition 4, if the buyer is unable to commit not to renegotiate,
she cannot benefit from using a scoring auction. A scoring auction by its multi-
dimensionality allows suppliers to differentiate their bids, which reduces price com-
petition. In other words, a more efficient supplier can offer a design that leads to
a higher score than a less efficient supplier. By doing so the more efficient supplier
may be able to win the auction even if his price bid is relatively high. This makes
the usage of a scoring auction expensive and thus less attractive to the procurer.
Hence, a price-only auction where the procurer collects price bids for a given design
COST OVERRUNS IN PROCUREMENT 22
is optimal. The given design is rather simple, so that the differences between suppli-
ers regarding their costs for delivering this design are relatively low. This enhances
the competition at the auction stage and leads to a very low initial price. Even
though the ex post price can be significantly higher than the initial price, the effect
on the initial price dominates.
The following result follows immediately from Proposition 4.
Corollary 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and that c(xL,
¯
θ) ≤ c(xH ,
¯
θ).
Then, a scoring function that is independent of the proposed design, i.e., ∆g = 0, is
optimal.
Instead of fixing an initial design, the procurer can also use a scoring auction
where suppliers are free to propose any x ∈ {xL, xH}. The award of the contract,
however, is solely based on the price bid – i.e., the supplier who placed the lowest
price bid is awarded with the contract. According to Corollary 2 such a scoring
auction is optimal if the fancy design has higher production costs than the standard
design for all supplier types (this is a sufficient but not a necessary condition).
Finally, note that if the scoring function represents the procurer’s true preferences,
each supplier θ bids the efficient design x∗(θ). In this case, there is no scope for
renegotiation. Avoiding renegotiation, however, is not in the procurer’s interest.
This is due to the fact that we assume efficient – Coasian – bargaining ex post and
that the gains from renegotiation are incorporated in the initial price bids.
5.4. Multi-Dimensional Auctions and Asymmetric Information. Consider
the binary types model of Subsection 4.1; i.e., the procurer cannot directly observe
the contractor’s cost type before renegotiation takes place. The difference to Sub-
section 4.1 is that we now allow the procurer to run a multi-dimensional auction.
Again, we restrict attention to quasi-linear scoring rules. The next result establishes
that the bidding functions from the case with Coasian bargaining ex post are also
part of an equilibrium when renegotiation potentially takes place under asymmetric
information (type maybe revealed via the bid).
Proposition 5. The suppliers’ equilibrium bids (xb(θ), pb(θ)) specified in Lemma 3
remain equilibrium bids under renegotiation with asymmetric information. More-
over, a pooling equilibrium does not exist.
This implies that the optimal scoring function is not affected by relaxing the
assumption of Coasian bargaining ex post; i.e., relaxing Assumption 2. In other
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words, the scoring function derived in Proposition 4 is also optimal in the case
where the procurer has to deduce the contractor’s type from the bid.24
6. Conclusion
We analyzed competitive procurement mechanisms in an environment where the
procurer is unable to commit not to renegotiate the contract ex post. Moreover,
the cost function of the supplier who has been awarded with the initial contract is
publicly observed ex post. Hence, if the initial design turns out to be ex post ineffi-
cient the parties adjust the initial design to the ex post efficient one; i.e., the parties
engage in Coasian bargaining. We showed that the constrained optimal award pro-
cedure is a price-only auction. The procurer awards the contract for the standard
design via a price-only auction. Ex post, the fancy design may be implemented via
contract renegotiation. If this is the case, the ultimate price typically is higher than
the initial price determined by the auction.
The findings of the paper rely on a couple of assumptions that often will not all be
satisfied in practice. Hence, we do not argue based on these results that most of the
projects with severe cost overruns that we observe in practice are always the result of
efficient award procedures. However, our main assumption that commitment not to
renegotiate is not feasible seems to be realistic. For instance, complex construction
projects often cannot be executed exactly the way as initially specified, so contract
renegotiation has to take place. This paper shows that severe cost overruns are not
necessarily a sign of inefficient award procedures or project completion.
Appendix A. Proofs and Calculations
Proof of Lemma 1. First, we show that the parties agree to trade x∗(θ). In contra-
diction, let (x̂, p̂) with x̂ 6= x∗(θ) be the outcome of renegotiation. The resulting
generalized Nash product is
(A.1) GNP (x̂, p̂) = [p̂− c(x̂, θ)− dC ]
α × [v(x̂)− p̂− dP ]
1−α .
Consider the alternative contract with design x∗(θ) and price p∗ = p̂ + v(x∗(θ)) −
v(x̂). By construction, the procurer is indifferent between the two contracts. The
contractor’s net payoff under the alternative contract is
(A.2) p∗ − c(x∗(θ), θ)− dC .
24This is less clear if there is a risk of breakdown of renegotiation: When the risk of such a
breakdown is high, scoring auctions where different types propose different designs are better at
implementing the ex post efficient design, which is likely to be in the procurer’s interest.
COST OVERRUNS IN PROCUREMENT 24
Hence, the contractor prefers the alternative contract if and only if
p̂+ v(x∗(θ))− c(x∗(θ), θ)− v(x̂)− dC ≥ p̂− c(x̂, θ)− dC
⇐⇒ v(x∗(θ))− c(x∗(θ), θ) ≥ v(x̂)− c(x̂, θ),(A.3)
which holds by the definition of x∗(θ) and the fact that
¯
x does not maximize the social
surplus. Thus, GNP (x∗(θ), p∗) > GNP (x̂, p̂) a contradiction to the assumption that
(x̂, p̂) is the outcome of renegotiation.









































Proof of Lemma 2. It is a well-known result that in a second-price auction it is a
(weakly) dominant strategy for each bidder to bid his type. Placing a bid equal to
the type, corresponds to placing a price bid so that the profit equals zero in our
setup. Placing a higher bid reduces the probability of winning the auction without
affecting the price
¯
p. A lower bid is not optimal because in the additional cases
where the supplier now wins the auction, he makes losses.








x, θ2). This property
of the bidding function follows immediately from Assumption 1. Note that S(θ) ≡
maxx{v(x)− c(x, θ)} and thus S(θ1) > S(θ2) by Assumption 1. 
Proof of Proposition 1. The procurer’s expected utility ex ante is
(A.6) E[u(
¯
x, θ1, θ2)] = E
[







The expected utility is maximized by the design
¯






By Assumption 1 the above expression is minimized for
¯
x = xL.
Renegotiation takes place if and only if θ1 < θ̃. From Lemma 1 it is readily
obtained that p̂−
¯
p > 0 if and only if
(A.8) α[v(xH)− v(xL)] + (1− α)[c(xH , θ
1)− c(xL, θ
1)] > 0,
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which completes the proof. 
Proof of Corollary 1. The result is shown in the main text. 
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof proceeds in three steps. First, we posit that the
procurer specifies
¯
x = xL initially. Thereafter, we posit that
¯
x = xH . Finally, we
show that there does not exist a pooling equilibrium. For the analysis we distinguish
two cases,
¯
x = xL and
¯
x = xH .
Case (I): Procurer sets
¯
x = xL
The offers made at the renegotiation stage are derived in the main text, which
allow us to derive the expected profits. At the auction stage, the expected profit of
a supplier of type θ is
π(
¯





p+ α[v(xH)− v(xL)] + (1− α)[c(xH , θ1)− c(xL, θ1)]− c(xH , θ1) if θ = θ1;
¯
p− c(xL, θ2) if θ = θ2.
(A.9)
A candidate for equilibrium bidding strategies are the bids that allow a supplier







c(xH , θ1)− α[v(xH)− v(xL)]− (1− α)[c(xH , θ1)− c(xL, θ1)] if θ = θ1;
c(xL, θ2) if θ = θ2.
The bid of type θ1 can be written as
(A.10)
¯
p(θ2|xL) = c(xL, θ1)− α
{









p(θ2, xL); i.e., if there is a supplier of type θ1, then a type
θ1 wins the auction.
Incentives to deviate: Does the bidding strategy (19) constitute an equilibrium?
First, consider a supplier of type θ2. When bidding
¯
p(θ2|xL) the supplier can win
only if all competitors are also of type θ2. In this case he wins with probability 1/n.
The expected profit is π = 0.
(i) Bidding p >
¯
p(θ2|xL): The supplier never wins and thus makes a zero profit
with certainty.




p(θ2|xL)): The supplier wins the auction if all com-
petitors are of type θ2. The price is
¯
p = c(xL, θ2). Behavior at the renegoti-
ation stage depends on the out-of-equilibrium belief of the procurer. If the




p(θ2|xL)) is of type
θ2, she does not make an offer at the renegotiation stage. If she believes that
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the supplier is with positive probability of type θ1, then she offers
¯
x = xH at
price p̂P . This offer is accepted by a type θ1 contractor but rejected by our
type θ2 contractor. If the contractor can make an offer, he does not propose
to change the design (changing the design decreases the generated surplus).
Hence, irrespective of who can make the offer and the procurer’s belief the
initial contract is executed. The expected utility of the considered supplier
is π = 0.
(iii) Bidding p ≤
¯
p(θ1|xL): Due to similar arguments as made in case (ii) the ini-
tial contract is always executed (either renegotiation fails or is not proposed
in the first place). Now, however, the supplier wins for sure. If there is a





price the supplier of type θ2 makes a loss and thus his expected profit from
this bid is negative as well.
To sum up, a supplier of type θ2 has no incentives to deviate.
Now, we consider a supplier of type θ1. When bidding
¯
p(θ1|xL) the supplier makes
a strictly positive profit if all competitors are of type θ2. If at least one rival is of
type θ1 all the expected rents from contract renegotiation are competed away.
(i) Bidding p >
¯
p(θ2|xL): The supplier never wins and thus makes a zero profit.




p(θ2|xL)): The supplier wins if all rivals are of type
θ2 the price is
¯
p = c(xL, θ2). If the supplier won the auction and can make
the TIOLI offer, he offers x̂ = xH at p̂ = p̂
C . This offer is accepted by the
procurer. If, on the other hand, the procurer can make the TIOLI offer,
she either offers x̂ = xH at p̂ = p̂
P or does not propose a renegotiation
contract. Depending on her beliefs about the supplier’s type, the former or
the latter strategy is optimal. In both cases, the contractor does not benefit
from contract renegotiation. He benefits only if he can make the offer. Thus,




p(θ2|xL)) is not strictly preferred to bidding
¯
p(θ1|xL).
(iii) Bidding p <
¯
p(θ1|xL): Now, the supplier wins for sure. In the additional
cases where the supplier now wins, he makes an expected profit of at most
zero. If contract renegotiation takes place, the offered contracts are the same
as in case (ii).
A type θ1 supplier has no incentive to deviate.
The proposed equilibrium is not the unique separating equilibrium. As it is well-
known, the second-price auction has many equilibria and this holds true also in our
model with asymmetric information at the renegotiation stage.
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Procurer’s expected profit: The procurer’s realized profit depends on the most
efficient type θ1 and the second most efficient type θ2. We denote the expected
profit by E[u(
¯
x, θ1, θ2)]. We distinguish three cases.
(i) θ1 = θ2 = θ2: In this case, renegotiation does not take place and the pro-
curer’s utility amounts to
u(xL, θ2, θ2) = v(xL)− c(xL, θ2)
= S(θ2).(A.11)
(ii) θ1 = θ2 = θ1: In this case, renegotiation takes place. The procurer obtains





the procurer’s utility is
(A.12) u(xL, θ1, θ1) = v(xH)− c(xL, θ1)− α[c(xH , θ1)− c(xL, θ1)]
+ α[v(xH)− v(xL)]− α[v(xH)− v(xL)]− (1− α)[c(xH , θ1)− c(xL, θ1)],
which can be simplified to
u(xL, θ1, θ1) = v(xH)− c(xH , θ1)
= S(θ1).(A.13)
(iii) θ1 = θ1 and θ





p(θ2, xL). Thus, the procurer’s utility is
u(xL, θ1, θ2) = v(xH)− c(xL, θ2)− α[v(xH)− v(xL)]
−(1− α)[c(xH , θ1)− c(xL, θ1)]
= (1− α)S(θ1) + αS(θ2)− (1− α)[c(xL, θ2)− c(xL, θ1)].(A.14)
Case (II): Procurer sets
¯
x = xH
Now, there is no scope for renegotiation for type θ1. If the contractor is of type




The offer is accepted by the procurer. If the procurer can make the offer, she offers
x̂ = xL at
(A.16) p̂P =
¯
p− [c(xH , θ2)− c(xL, θ2)].
This offer is accepted by type θ2. The expected final price of a supplier of type θ2 is
(A.17) p̂ =
¯
p− α[v(xH)− v(xL)]− (1− α)[c(xH , θ2)− c(xL, θ2)].
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At the auction stage, the expected profit of a supplier of type θ is
π(
¯





p− c(xH , θ1) if θ = θ1;
¯
p− α[v(xH)− v(xL)]− (1− α)[c(xH , θ2)− c(xL, θ2)]− c(xL, θ2) if θ = θ2.
(A.18)






c(xH , θ1) if θ = θ1;
αc(xL, θ2) + (1− α)c(xH , θ2) + α[v(xH)− v(xL)] if θ = θ2.
The bid of type θ2 can be written as
(A.19)
¯





p(θ2|xH) is equivalent to
(A.20) α
{
[v(xL)− c(xL, θ2)]− [v(xH)− c(xH , θ2)]
}
< c(xH , θ2)− c(xH , θ1).
The left-hand side of (A.20) is positive because x∗(θ2) = xL. Thus, if condition
(A.20) is satisfied for α = 1, then it is satisfied for all α ∈ (0, 1). For α = 1
inequality (A.20) is equivalent to
(A.21) v(xL)− c(xL, θ2) < v(xH)− c(xH , θ1),
which is always satisfied (S(θ2) < S(θ1)).
This result implies that if there is a supplier of type θ1, then a supplier of type θ1
wins the auction.
Incentives to deviate: Does the bidding strategy (20) constitute an equilibrium?
First, we consider a supplier of type θ2. When bidding
¯
p(θ2|xH) the supplier wins
only if all competitors are also of type θ2 and he is the one who is selected randomly.
In this case, renegotiation takes always place but the expected profit equals zero.
(i) Bidding p >
¯
p(θ2|xH): The supplier never wins and thus makes a zero profit.




p(θ2|xH)): Now the supplier wins with certainty if all




p(θ2|xH). If the contractor
can make the renegotiation offer, he offers x̂ = xL at p̂ = p̂
C . In this case
he makes a positive profit. If the procurer can make the TIOLI offer, she
either offers x̂ = xL at p̂ = p̂
P or no renegotiation contract (depending on
her out-off-equilibrium beliefs). In either case, the contractor does not make





p(θ2|xH) is such that the positive profits and the negative profits
just cancel out in expectation. The supplier’s expected profit from this bid
is zero.
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(iii) Bidding p ≤
¯
p(θ1|xH): Now, the supplier may win also in cases where some
competitors are of type θ1. In these cases, however, the supplier makes a loss
in expectations. The renegotiation offers are the same as in case (ii) but the





A supplier of type θ2 has no incentives to deviate.
Now, we consider a supplier of type θ1. When bidding
¯
p(θ1|xL) the supplier makes
a strictly positive profit if all competitors are of type θ2. If at least one rival is of
type θ1 all the expected rents from contract renegotiation are competed away.
(i) Bidding p >
¯
p(θ2|xH): The supplier never wins and thus makes a zero profit.




p(θ2|xH)): The supplier wins only if all competitors
are of type θ2. If the supplier wins and the procurer can make a TIOLI offer,
the procurer’s offer depends on her out-off-equilibrium beliefs. If she believes
the contractor is of type θ1, she does not make an offer. If she believes he
is of type θ2 (with positive probability), she offers x̂ = xL at p̂ = p̂
P . This
offer, however, is rejected by the supplier of type θ1 because
(A.22)
¯
p− c(xH , θ2) + c(xL, θ2)− c(xL, θ1) <
¯
p− c(xH , θ1).
(iii) Bidding p ≤
¯
p(θ1|xH): For such a bid the supplier wins the auction for
sure. In the additional cases where he wins, the initial (and final) price is
¯
p = c(xH , θ1). Renegotiation does not take place or is unsuccessful by similar
reasoning as in case (ii). Hence, in the additional cases where the supplier
wins, he makes a zero profit.
A supplier of type θ1 has no strict incentive to deviate.
Procurer’s expected profit: The procurer’s realized profit depends on the most
efficient type θ1 and the second most efficient type θ2. We distinguish three cases.




p(θ2|xH). The procurer’s (expected) utility is
u(xH , θ2, θ2) = v(xL)− c(xL, θ2)
= S(θ2).(A.23)
(ii) θ1 = θ2 = θ1: In this case, renegotiation does not takes place. The initial
and final price is
¯
p = c(xH , θ1). Thus, the procurer’s utility is
u(xH , θ1, θ1) = v(xH)− c(xH , θ1)
= S(θ1).(A.24)
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(iii) θ1 = θ1 and θ
2 = θ2: In this case, renegotiation does not take place and the




p(θ2|xH). Thus, the procurer’s utility is
u(xH , θ1, θ2) = v(xH)− αc(xL, θ2)− (1− α)c(xH , θ2)− α[v(xH)− v(xL)]
= (1− α)S(θ1) + αS(θ2)− (1− α)[c(xH , θ2)− c(xH , θ1)].(A.25)
Comparison of profits: The procurer optimally specifies
¯
x = xL if and only if
E[u(xL, θ
1, θ2)] > E[u(xH , θ
1, θ2)], which is equivalent to
(A.26) c(xH , θ2)− c(xL, θ2) > c(xH , θ1)− c(xL, θ1).
The above inequality is always satisfied under the imposed assumptions, which
proves the first part of the proposition.
Pooling equilibria: It remains to be shown that there does not exist a pooling
equilibrium. To see this consider the case
¯
x = xL. The only candidate for a pooling
equilibrium is the bid
¯
p = c(xL, θ2). There is no scope for renegotiation for type θ2
and thus this type never makes a renegotiation offer. If a type θ1 wins and can make
the offer, he proposes x̂ = xH at price p̂ =
¯
p + v(xH) − v(xL). This is accepted by
the procurer. If the procurer can make the offer, the optimal offer – independent of
her belief – is x̂ = xH at price p̂ =
¯
p + c(xH , θ1) − c(xL, θ1). This offer is accepted
by a contractor of type θ1 but rejected by a contractor of type θ2. In expectations a
type θ1 contractor makes a strictly positive profit at the renegotiation stage. Hence,
he has an incentive to place a bid p < c(xL, θ2). This increases his probability of
winning – from 1/n to 1 – without affecting his (expected) profit in case he wins the
auction.
A similar argument can be made also for the case
¯
x = xH .

Proof of Proposition 3. If renegotiation takes place, then the outcome is character-










p, θ) = (1− b)[p̂(
¯







p+ (1− b)α[S(θ)− v(
¯
x)]− [1− α(1− b)]c(
¯
x, θ).(A.27)
From the above expression the next result is readily obtained.
Lemma 5. The symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy is
¯
p(θ) = (1− b)α[v(
¯
x)− S(θ)] + [1− α(1− b)]c(
¯
x, θ).
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The above lemma can be proven by the usual steps (as in the proof of Lemma 2).
The most efficient type θ1 wins the auction and the initial price is determined by
the second most efficient type θ2, which is given by
(A.28)
¯
p(θ2) = (1− b)α[v(
¯
x)− S(θ2)] + [1− α(1− b)]c(
¯
x, θ2).
The final price is given by
(A.29) p̂(θ1, θ2) = α(1− b)v(
¯





x)] + (1− α)[c(x∗(θ1), θ1)− c(
¯
x, θ1)].
The procurer’s ex post utility for given realizations of θ1 and θ2 is
(A.30) u(
¯




p(θ2)] + (1− b)[v(x∗(θ1)− p̂(θ1, θ2)].
Inserting the expressions for p̂ and
¯
p in the procurer’s utility and rearranging yields
(A.31) u(
¯
x, θ1, θ2) = (1− b)[(1− α)S(θ1) + αS(θ2)]









Noting that the procurer maximizes E[u(
¯
x, θ1, θ2)] by choosing
¯
x completes the proof.

Supplementary Calculations to Example 1. When choosing
¯




b(1− θ2)− (1− α)(1− b)(θ2 − θ1)
]
.
On the other hand, when choosing
¯
x = xH , her expected payoff amounts to
(A.33) Eθ1,θ2
[
b(2− 3θ2)− (1− α)(1− b)3(θ2 − θ1)
]
.
Thus, the procurer optimally chooses
¯
x = xL iff
(A.34) Eθ1,θ2
[
b(2θ2 − 1) + (1− α)(1− b)2θ2 − (1− α)(1− b)2θ1
]
≥ 0,
which is equivalent to
(A.35) 2(1− α + αb)Eθ2 [θ
2] ≥ 2(1− α)(1− b)Eθ1 [θ
1] + b.
By using the distribution of the lowest and the second lowest type realization (order
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
Proof of Lemma 3. Each supplier has an incentive to place the bid (xb, pb) that max-
imizes the score G(x, p) subject to the supplier’s break-even constraint.
Bidding a lower score reduces the probability of winning without affecting the
concluded contract in case the supplier wins the auction. As in a second-price
auction, the concluded contract is independent of the bid placed by the winner.
Bidding a higher score increases the probability of winning. In the additional cases
where the supplier now wins, he has to match a score at which he makes losses.




s.t. p+ αS(θ)− αv(x)− (1− α)c(x, θ) ≥ 0.
The solution is xB(θ) and pb(θ), which concludes the proof; see also Che (1993). 




b(θ2), θ2) + αS(θ2)
< g(xb(θ2))− αv(x
b(θ2))− (1− α)c(x
b(θ2), θ1) + αS(θ1)
≤ g(xb(θ1))− αv(x
b(θ1))− (1− α)c(x
b(θ1), θ1) + αS(θ1)
= G(θ1).
The first inequality follows from Assumption 1 and the second inequality holds by
the definition of xb(·). 
Proof of Proposition 4. The procurer’s payoff maximization problem can be restated












By the definition of xB(·), the term (A.38) is (weakly) larger than
Eθ1,θ2
{
(1− α)[c(xb(θ2), θ2)− c(xb(θ1), θ1)}
]
.(A.39)
Hence, it is optimal that xb(θ2) = xb(θ1) = xL. In this case, (A.38) coincides with its
lower bound and the lower bound is minimized. That the lower bound is minimized
for xb(θ2) = xb(θ1) = xL follows from Assumption 1(ii).
A supplier of type θ places a design bid xb(θ) = xL iff
(A.40) α[v(xH)− v(xL)] + (1− α)[c(xH , θ)− c(xL, θ)] ≥ g(xH)− g(xL).
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By Assumption 1(ii), if the above inequality holds for θ =
¯
θ, then it holds for all
θ ∈ Θ. This establishes the first part of the proposition. The statement regarding
the price adjustment follows directly from the proof of Proposition 1.

Proof of Corollary 2. The result follows directly from Proposition 4. 
Proof of Proposition 5. As in Subsection 4.1, we assume that there are two different
types, θ ∈ {θ1, θ2}, and rather than applying the GNBS, we assume that the con-
tractor can make a TIOLI offer with probability α ∈ (0, 1) and the procurer can do
so with a probability 1 − α. Again, we assume that c(xL, θ1) < c(xL, θ2) and that





xH for θ = θ1;
xL for θ = θ2.
Recall that these assumptions imply
c(xH , θ2) > c(xL, θ2),
c(xH , θ2)− c(xL, θ2) > v(xH)− v(xL) > c(xH , θ1)− c(xL, θ1),
and S(θ1) > S(θ2).
As equilibrium concept, we employ perfect Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies.
Now, we proceed with the actual proof. Suppose each supplier with type θ bids
xb(θ) ∈ argmax
x∈X
{g(x)− αv(x)− (1− α)c(x, θ)} ,
pb(θ) = αv(xb(θ)) + (1− α)c(xb(θ), θ)− αS(θ).
Then, the procurer can perfectly deduce the contractor’s type from his bid and/or
the initial contract. There are up to four different cases: (i) xb(θ1) = x
b(θ2) = xH , (ii)
xb(θ1) = x
b(θ2) = xL, (iii) x
b(θ1) = xH , x
b(θ2) = xL, and (iv) x
b(θ1) = xL, x
b(θ2) =
xH . For cases (i) and (ii), the analysis is analogous to the analysis of price-only
auctions in Subsection 4.1, where (xb(θ), pb(θ)) as specified in Lemma 3 are optimal.
Case (iii): Suppose that xb(θ2) = xL and x
b(θ1) = xH . In equilibrium, there will
be no renegotiation. Type θ2 does not want to deviate, because then he would make
losses. If a supplier with type θ1 imitates type θ2 and all other suppliers are type θ2
(otherwise he could not win the auction if all others play their equilibrium strategy),
he would win the auction with a probability 1
n
, and could make a TIOLI offer with
probability α. Hence, he would make an expected profit of α
n
[v(xH) − v(xL) −
c(xH , θ1) + c(xL, θ2)]. If he played his equilibrium strategy, his profits in that case
would be g(xH)− p
b(θ1)− g(xL) + p
b(θ2) = g(xH)− g(xL)− [c(xH , θ1)− c(xL, θ2)].
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Because xb(θ1) = xH , we have g(xH) − g(xL) − [c(xH , θ1) − c(xL, θ2)] ≥ α[v(xH) −
v(xL)] − α[c(xH , θ1) − c(xL, θ2)] >
α
n
[v(xH) − v(xL) − c(xH , θ1) + c(xL, θ2)]. Thus,
deviation is not profitable. In fact, because the inequality is strict, there does not
exist a pooling equilibrium.
Now we show that case (iv) does not exist. Suppose that xb(θ2) = xH . Thus,
g(xH)− αv(xH)− (1− α)c(xH , θ2) ≥ g(xL)− αv(xL)− (1− α)c(xL, θ2) ⇔ g(xH)−
g(xL) ≥ α[v(xH) − v(xL)] + (1 − α)[c(xH , θ2) − c(xL, θ2)]. Because c(xH , θ2) −
c(xL, θ2) > c(xH , θ1)− c(xL, θ1), it follows that x
b(θ1) = xH .

Appendix B. Revenue equivalence
Here we show that the procurer’s expected utility is the same for all standard
auctions and their corresponding scoring auctions. In particular, this implies that
all of our findings hold for first-price auctions and first-score auctions. We rely on
the findings of Asker and Cantillon (2008).
First, let us define a supplier’s pseudotype,
(B.1) k(θ) = max
x
{
g(x)− c(x, θ) + α{[v(x∗(θ))− c(x∗(θ), θ)]− [v(x)− c(x, θ)]}
}
,
and let z(k, (k−) be the allocation rule, i.e., the probability that a supplier with
pseudotype k is awarded the contract, given the other players have the pseudotypes
k− (and play their equilibrium strategies). Let z(k) denote the expected probability
that a supplier with pseudotype k is awarded the contract.
Proposition 6 (Asker and Cantillon (2008), Theorem 2). Any two scoring auctions
with a quasi-linear scoring rule G(x, p) that use the same allocation rule z(k, (k−),





same expected utility for the buyer.
Proof. With our definition of pseudotypes, our setting is included in Asker and
Cantillon (2008), except for the assumption in Asker and Cantillon (2008) that the
scoring rule be strictly increasing in the quality (i.e., the design). However, all
arguments leading up to their Theorem 2 do not rely on that assumption. 
It follows immediately:
Corollary 3. First- and second-price auctions with the same ex-ante design generate
the same expected utility for the buyer in our setting.
Corollary 4. First- and second-score auctions with the same quasi-linear scoring
rule G(x, p) generate the same expected utility for the buyer in our setting.
Thus, our results carry over to first-price and first-score auctions.
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